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Under the background of counter economic globalization, the Group of 
Twenty (G20) has become the primary platform for the east and west 
powers to seek consultation and dialogue. And the coordination mecha-
nism of the new global powers has come into being slowly. As a multi-
lateral regional bank, the BRICsBank takes the interests of developing 
countries as the leading factor. Based on international economic cooper-
ation ground, it will broaden the South-South cooperation to create more 
convenient conditions for foreign direct investment, as well as bilateral 
and multilateral financial cooperation. From new power coordination per-
spective, with global economy governance structure transformation as the 
starting point, this research accurately defines the concept of coordination 
mechanism, systematically analyzes the evolution of global economic 
governance structure, intensively interprets the current characteristics of 
big power coordination mode in global economic governance structure, 
and objective assesses trends of global political and economic pattern.
It is of important policy reference implications for the BRICS member 
countries to effectively promote the BRICs Bank institutionalization and 
global governance of new power coordination nature. 
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1. Introduction
The global economic governance structure is a re-lationship structure formed by the interaction of state actors in international economic activities, es-
pecially the result and state of power distribution of state 
actors, which shapes the interaction mode among state 
actors. This interaction takes the coordination of national 
interests as the core. The big countries are often in the 
central zone of the whole international relations structure, 
while the small countries are more often in the periphery 
of power structure, thus the mode of interaction between 
countries shaped by global economic governance structure 
is mainly a mode of coordination among big powers. With 
the continuous change of the strength comparison among 
the national actors, their position in the global economic 
structure has also changed, and the coordination model of 
the big powers has also shown multi-form changes in the 
evolution of the global economic governance structure. 
In order to avoid financial risks such as currency market 
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shocks caused by the financial tsunami in the 21st cen-
tury, the BRICS Leaders Summit in 2012 proposed the 
establishment of BRICS Development Bank to build a 
financial safety net. In 2014, BRICS countries formally 
signed the Agreement for the Establishment of the BRICS 
New Development Bank. In July 2015, the BRICS New 
Development Bank (BRICS) was established, which was 
the first major cooperation project of BRICS mechanism 
since its establishment[1]. It also marked the formal be-
ginning of the institutionalization of BRICS. In 2016, 
the New Development Bank approved seven projects 
from five member countries, mainly in the fields of green 
energy and transportation, with a scale of 1.5 billion US 
dollars. It was expected to promote more foreign invest-
ment into BRICS countries in the future. Since the con-
cept of BRICS Bank was put forward, most academics 
have analyzed the opportunities and challenges faced 
by BRICS Bank from the purpose of its establishment, 
under the background of the huge shortage of funds for 
global infrastructure construction. However, few scholars 
have studied the mission of BRICS regional development 
banks to improve the stability of the existing international 
financial system from the perspective of global economic 
governance. The BRICS website clearly describes itself as 
an "alternative for US-led mechanism between the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund" designed to 
address the infrastructure and sustainable development 
needs of emerging economies. At the same time, both 
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have 
expressed their expectations for cooperation with BRICS. 
With global economy governance structure transformation 
as the starting point, this research makes opportunities 
and risks analysis of the BRICs Bank from new power 
coordination perspective, accurately defining the concept 
of coordination mechanism, systematically analyzing the 
evolution of global economic governance structure, inten-
sively interpreting the current characteristics of big power 
coordination mode in global economic governance struc-
ture, and objectively assessing trends of global political 
and economic pattern[2]. Qualitative analyzing approach 
under international political economy theoretical logic is 
the main methodology of the whole research. The findings 
and contributions are of particular policy reference impli-
cations for the five countries to effectively promote the 
BRICs Bank institutionalization and global governance of 
new power coordination nature.
2. The Definition of Coordination Mode of 
Great Powers
Coordination mode of great powers refers to an interna-
tional relations mechanism in which great powers make 
decisions through meetings and deal with international 
political and economic conflicts and crises in accordance 
with common rules such as consensus, responsibility and 
intervention. The big countries are often in the central 
zone of the whole international relations structure, while 
the small countries are more often in the periphery of 
power structure, thus the mode of interaction between 
countries shaped by global economic governance struc-
ture is mainly a mode of coordination among big powers. 
With the changing of the times background, there are 
continuous changes of the strength comparison among the 
national actors, and their positions in the global economic 
structure has also changed.
2.1. Bretton Woods System: Coordination Mo-
nopoly Model of Great Powers
The absolute advantage of the United States in the world 
economy began in the period of World War II and steadily 
became the unique hegemony of the international order. 
Since then, the coordination model of global powers has 
existed in the form of unipolar monopoly. Based on the 
profound reflection on the impact of the Great Depres-
sion and the two world wars, the United States estab-
lished the basic framework of post-war global economic 
governance, the Bretton Woods system, by virtue of its 
hegemonic position[3]. Since the beginning of economic 
globalization, the world economy has gradually entered 
the process of integration. The Bretton Woods system is 
a gold exchange standard based mechanism on the US 
dollar and gold, with US dollar accordingly ascending 
the leading position in the international monetary system. 
The U.S. government declared that it will fulfill its obliga-
tion of converting US dollars into gold. The coordination 
mode of the major global governing powers in this period 
is mainly embodied in the monopoly mode.
2.2. G7 Age: Club-style Coordination Model of 
Great Powers
With the rise of Japan and Western Europe in the 1970s 
and the relative weakness of the US economy, the large 
fluctuation of the US dollar exchange rate eventually led 
to the disintegration of the Bretton Woods system. The 
inefficiency of the traditional mechanisms of IMF global 
governance was highlighted, and the multilateral trade 
negotiations of GATT became increasingly difficult. The 
establishment of G7 symbolizes the evolution of the co-
ordination model of major powers in global economic 
governance from the monopoly model dominated by the 
United States to that of big powers in group clubs. The 
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coordination efficiency of Western macroeconomic pol-
icies and global monetary, financial, trade and exchange 
rate cooperation thus has been greatly improved[4]. G7 
implements the club-like coordination model of "soft sys-
tem" to replace the "hard system" monopoly model of the 
United States. The global economic governance structure 
gradually presents the club-like coordination model of 
big powers. However, G7 is still an informal governance 
mechanism for Western powers to maintain world eco-
nomic stability, with the skewness of the distribution of 
international interests between the East and the West be-
coming increasingly apparent.
2.3. G20 Era: a New Coordination Model of Great 
Powers
The outbreak of the Asian financial crisis made the G7 
realize that the stable development of the world economy 
urgently needs new coordination and cooperation between 
developed and emerging powers. As another informal 
global governance mechanism of the Bretton Woods sys-
tem, the G20 is an excellent platform for consultation and 
dialogue between Western and emerging powers in the 
context of deepening economic globalization. The G20 
aims to promote consultation and cooperation in various 
fields of international economy and promote the balanced 
evolution of global economic governance structure. How-
ever, ten years after its establishment, global economic 
governance was still dominated by the G7-centered West-
ern powers, which operated through informal dialogue and 
consultation between finance ministers and central bank 
governors, and did not play the expected role of global 
economic governance[5].
Since the 21st century, the group rise of emerging 
economies has rewritten the international power contrast 
between the East and the West, which directly promotes 
the substantive transformation of the world economic 
structure. The rise of emerging market countries not only 
has an impact on the global economic structure in terms 
of economic aggregate, but also has a substantial impact 
on global economic governance in terms of institutional 
structure. In order to cope with this indisputable fact in 
time, developed countries have taken the initiative to in-
corporate large developing countries into the framework 
of global governance in line with their economic inter-
ests. They can not only share in their growth dividends, 
but also control the way and speed of their economic 
growth to a certain extent, thus maintaining the dominant 
position of the West in global economic governance.
The 2008 financial tsunami made the coordination 
model of G7 Club powers no longer able to meet the re-
alistic requirements of global economic governance. De-
veloped countries could not unilaterally control and deal 
with such a serious and rapid global economic problem. 
The once marginalized G20 has quickly stepped onto 
the stage of global economic governance and effectively 
mitigated the spread of the crisis. Different from the for-
mer club-style big country coordination mode dominated 
by western big powers, this has prompted a new type of 
big country coordination governance mode to begin to 
play its due role. This new coordination model ensures 
that emerging and developed powers share a relative-
ly equal position in the global economic governance 
structure, thus forming a global multilateral network to 
co-govern the world economy. 
3. Construction of BRICS Bank Mechanism
3.1. Construction of Ideological Mechanism
Since its inception, BRICS has been adhering to the 
pioneering spirit of "equality" as the core and "mutual 
benefit" and "innovation". Specifically, "equality" means 
that the initial subscription capital of BRICS is funded 
equally by five countries, and all countries share the right 
to vote (20 percent). No one country has the right to veto. 
It is the first time in the history of the construction of 
the international financial organization that all countries 
have an equal dialogue under the multilateral mechanism 
regardless of their economic development. The promo-
tion of spirit of equality, i.e. the adoption of affirmative 
decision-making mechanism, is a compromise solution 
to seek common ground while reserving differences in a 
sense, because there are not only common interests and 
motives for cooperation among member countries, but 
also conflicts of interest and differences of opinion that 
hinder cooperation[ Ji Xiaoqing and Qiao Yue, "Equal 
Decision-Making Mechanism of BRICS Bank: Efficien-
cy Loss and Its Improvement", Shanghai Finance, No. 
2, 2017]. "Mutual benefit" refers to the phenomenon 
that BRICS banks avoid traditional developed countries 
forcing recipient countries to reform by imposing harsh 
conditions by reducing political interference and realizing 
commercialization. The implementation of the concept 
of "mutual benefit" is based on the spirit of "equality" 
and the non-humanitarian act of providing economic 
assistance on the condition of contracting the recipient 
country's economy to solve the abuse of Monetary Ap-
proach by some developed countries[6]. "Innovation" is a 
feature that BRICS has been emphasizing: it embodies in 
the unique BRICS economic alliance, the implementation 
of the affirmative decision-making mechanism, and also 
in the way of opposing "top-down, aid-recipient" and the 
needs of recipient countries as the basis of aid.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/mmpp.v1i1.741
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3.2. Mechanism Problems and Solutions
Firstly, the problem of the affirmative mechanism equity 
and efficiency. It is clear that the adoption of the affirma-
tive power mechanism is based on avoiding polarization 
caused by the "strong economy" in other contemporary in-
ternational financial organizations and reducing the "tun-
nel effect" of harming others and self-interest. However, 
there will be the fairness issue of "the same to earn more 
and earn less" and the efficiency issue of "being divided 
too much and difficult to make decisions". The issue of 
equity is reflected in the fact that the "rotating presiden-
cy" adopted to achieve affirmative decision-making may 
make the BRICS banking policy periodic. On the issue of 
efficiency, Dr. Ji Xiaoqing and Dr. Qiaoyue have pointed 
out in Brick Bank's Equitable Decision-making Mecha-
nism: Efficiency Loss and its Improvement that "BRIC 
Bank will be seriously restricted by the heterogeneity of 
economic development and policy orientation in BRIC 
Group member countries." The essence of the problem 
is "non-political", that is, whether BRICS can really get 
rid of the political interference and "commerciality" of 
member countries, that is, whether BRICS can achieve 
real benefit-driven and risk-averse[7]. In this regard, the 
co-presidents of the five countries or the economic author-
ity of other countries can be selected as non-stakeholders 
to participate in decision-making, transparency of BRICS 
annual statistical statements and public supervision of de-
cision-making to help equity; as far as possible, to ensure 
that the representatives of member countries are singular, 
in extreme cases, the growth retains a veto power, and 
employees are paid on the basis of performance or on the 
basis of starting salary. Bonus and other mechanisms to 
ensure efficiency. In a word, the realization of fairness and 
efficiency depends on continuing to implement the con-
cept of "mutual assistance" and combining the concept of 
"innovation" to create the most "commercial" policy bank 
in the BRICS system by breaking the traditional innova-
tion mechanism.
Secondly, the problem of BRICS countries'competi-
tiveness in resource allocation. As the main function of 
BRICS Bank is to provide financing for infrastructure 
construction and sustainable development for member 
countries and other countries, the competition of re-
sources has an important impact on the development of 
BRICS Bank's existing functions. The problem of re-
source competition is essentially caused by huge demand 
for resources and defective allocation mechanism (vot-
ing rights). And primary energy demand is also the root 
cause of the latter, so the former is only discussed here. 
This issue concerns the economic structure of BRICS 
countries. The economic growth of BRICS countries, to 
a certain extent, is also an extensive economic growth 
mode, driven by high capital, high resources, high energy 
and high labor input. On the one hand, there are realistic 
reasons for this phenomenon, that is, the development 
based on the comparative advantages of resources and 
labor force[8]. On the other hand, in the decision-making 
level of choosing the development path, excessive pur-
suit of growth rate, focus on rapid expansion of quantity 
and neglect the improvement of economic efficiency and 
quality. Therefore, the extensive economy directly in-
creases the resource demand of member countries, which 
leads to the problem of resource competition, intensifies 
internal contradictions and even threatens the sustain-
ability of cooperation mechanism. Thus, it is feasible 
and necessary to change the mode of economic devel-
opment, such as tilting towards the tertiary industry or 
implementing "supply-side reform" or developing alter-
native energy sources (in line with the concept of "decar-
bonization"). These measures aim to solve the problem 
of competitiveness from the root by reducing the growth 
rate of fossil energy demand.
Subsequently, the problem of mechanism construction 
prospect. As China's "Belt and Road" initiative is ad-
vancing, the cooperation between the countries along the 
border and China is becoming more and more closely 
related. Its practical interests, such as infrastructure con-
struction, will have a huge impact on the strategic layout. 
Therefore, it is not possible to exclude the possibility of 
cooperation between other countries and BRICs banks. 
However, under the existing system, "BRICS countries 
shall inject not less than 55 percent of capital" is not 
conducive to long-term fairness and commercialization. 
As a holding group of BRICS countries, it is difficult 
for BRICS banks to achieve commercialization. This 
may need to be considered in terms of changing existing 
charters or increasing BRICS membership.
4. Opportunities and Challenges of BRICS 
Bank from the Perspective of New Big Coun-
tries
4.1. Opportunities implied by BRICS Bank
4.1.1. Multilateral Cooperation in Emerging 
Economies
BRICS is a breakthrough challenge for BRICS countries 
to the Bretton Woods institutions. Its intention is to build 
an international financial system dominated by emerging 
economies outside the World Bank, which not only her-
alds a more substantive stage of development in BRICS 
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cooperation, but also helps to build a more diversified 
international monetary system, reduce over-reliance on 
the US dollar as a global reserve currency, and improve 
the ability of countries to resist potential financial risks. 
The first BRICS Leaders Summit was held in 2009, which 
rekindled the high expectation of the international com-
munity for "South-South cooperation", and the long-term 
monopoly of multilateral banking territories by developed 
countries was finally broken. The BRICS Bank focuses on 
long-term development financing and provides financial 
support for infrastructure construction and sustainable 
development in BRICS countries and other emerging 
economies[9]. At the same time, the BRICS Emergency 
Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund was established to main-
tain financial stability and provide short-term liquidity 
support when member countries are facing balance of 
payments pressures. Both mechanisms are self-service 
financial system arrangements for emerging economies, 
providing financial public goods services to regions and 
even the world, paying particular attention to financial 
security, and avoiding the failure of traditional economic 
governance mechanisms at some points. From 2003 to 
2012, the volume of inter-BRICS trade increased rapidly 
from 36.5 to 310 billion US dollars, significantly faster 
than the growth of inter-regional trade in other parts of the 
world. Grigoriev, a professor in the Department of World 
Economy and International Politics at the Russian Acade-
my of Higher Economics, believes that BRICS members 
are now entering a critical stage of economic restructuring 
and need adequate financial support in the search for a 
new growth model. BRICS is an important financing plat-
form for BRICS countries, a think tank to solve specific 
development problems, and an important tool to stimulate 
economic growth.
At the same time, global capital outflows from BRICS 
countries has increased from 1 percent to 10 percent, 
becoming an important source of global investment 
funds. BRICS banks are more conducive to the use 
of local currency for trade and investment settlement 
between BRICS countries and emerging economies, 
reducing the risks implied in the US dollar, Euro and 
Yen as settlement currencies, saving transaction costs, 
promoting inter-country capital flows, trade exchanges 
and internationalization of local currencies, and opening 
up new channels for foreign non-direct investment to 
enter BRICS countries. BRICS has greatly broadened 
the path of South-South cooperation, creating more con-
venient conditions for transnational direct investment, 
bilateral and multilateral financial cooperation. The main 
difference between BRICS and other international finan-
cial institutions is that BRICS is based on the interests 
of developing countries, and its beneficiaries are not 
limited to five founding member countries, nor to some 
countries or regions, but to the platform of economic 
and trade cooperation among developing countries and 
the useful complement of existing international financial 
institutions[10]. Russian President Vladimir Putin has said 
that the BRICS Bank and the foreign exchange reserve 
pool will effectively strengthen the construction of the 
international financial system and make it more equitable 
and perfect.
4.1.2. The Construction of RMB Internationaliza-
tion Geo-strategy
The RMB internationalization is the gradual process in 
which RMB exerts its functions of value storage, trading 
medium and accounting unit in the international scope. 
The establishment of BRICS Bank provides a rare oppor-
tunity for the internationalization of RMB. Firstly, BRICS 
has broadened the space for RMB to be incorporated into 
global official reserves, and will further make the value 
storage function of RMB fully play and improve its inter-
national reserve status. As of September 2014, the Peo-
ple's Bank of China has signed currency swap agreements 
with monetary authorities in 25 countries and regions, 
with a total size of 2728.2 billion yuan. Currency swap 
agreement is a prudent way for China to provide liquidity 
support to local areas. It will not only help the bilateral 
trade and investment development of RMB valuation and 
settlement, but also enhance the function of RMB official 
international reserve. Unlike general commercial banks, 
BRICS does not absorb any commercial deposits and 
operates solely on sovereign credit. In the initial stage, 
BRICS only invests as capital to provide development 
assistance funds for member countries and other emerging 
economies. But in the medium and long term, BRICS will 
need to raise funds on a large scale or issue bonds and 
other derivatives denominated in RMB in financial mar-
kets to allocate RMB assets to international investors, in-
cluding governments, so as to promote the overall process 
of RMB internationalization. The World Bank welcomes 
the establishment of the BRICS Bank because its resource 
allocation and export-oriented concept complement the 
strategic objectives of the World Bank.
Secondly, the potential of capital export implied in the 
establishment of BRICS Bank also helps to promote the 
process of RMB internationalization. BRICS countries 
and emerging economies have abundant natural resource 
reserves, total population and huge market potential. 
However, constrained by weak infrastructure conditions, 
economic growth in many countries is still low. The 
BRICS Bank focuses on infrastructure construction in 
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BRICS countries and other emerging economies[11]. In-
frastructure gaps in Brazil, South Africa, Russia and In-
dia are huge and need to cooperate with overseas funds 
when national financial resources are not available. 
BRICS not only targets five BRICS countries, but also 
provides loans for infrastructure projects in all emerging 
economies to promote corresponding sustainable eco-
nomic growth. China has sufficient foreign exchange 
reserves, and has rich experience and advantages in 
infrastructure construction. In the next few years, infra-
structure projects jointly built by China and other BRICS 
countries will include the Liangyang Railway, which 
links the soybean production areas in central and West-
ern Brazil, and the Beijing-Moscow high-speed railway 
project. At the same time, the demand for foreign financ-
ing in the fields of mining investment in Africa is also 
growing. BRICS will create opportunities for in-depth 
cooperation between China and Africa. The prospect of 
RMB as a financing currency for infrastructure projects 
in emerging economies is very broad. As a result, the 
capital export of BRICS Bank naturally becomes anoth-
er driving force to promote the internationalization of 
RMB.
Thirdly, BRICS Bank can greatly promote the region-
al settlement and circulation of China's local currency. 
The billing unit and trading media functions of RMB 
in regional trade and investment can further expand the 
payment and settlement scope of RMB in international 
trade and financial transactions, and further promote the 
internationalization of RMB. Traditional import and ex-
port trade often need to be converted into international 
currencies such as the United States dollar for payment. 
The major international settlement currencies such as 
the US dollar, the euro and the Japanese yen fluctuate 
frequently in recent years. On the one hand, emerging 
economies face the risk of exchange rate changes direct-
ly; on the other hand, they have to bear various curren-
cy liquidation risks such as credit risk. Trade between 
BRICS countries is becoming more and more frequent. 
China has become the main trading partner of other 
BRICS countries[12]. Brazil and Russia are the ninth and 
tenth largest trading partners of China respectively. They 
are also important sources of energy and raw materials 
imports for China. International oil, iron ore and other 
commodities are currently mainly denominated in US 
dollars. If denominated in RMB, the risk of exchange be-
tween the two sides of the trade will be greatly reduced.
4.1.3. The Compatible Logic of the Rise of Great 
Powers under the Initiative of "Belt and Road"
The purpose of the BRIC bank is to provide support for 
the transport, energy and other infrastructure and sustain-
able development in developing countries. It is not only 
consistent with the infrastructure strategy of the countries 
along the belt, but also is committed to diversified invest-
ment and financing strategies, giving priority to the use of 
financing channels such as the local debt market of Mem-
ber States, and releasing the savings and potential infra-
structure of high savings countries such as China, and the 
demand to develop investment projects with stable prof-
itability and public spillover effect. China, Russia, South 
Africa, India and other BRICs bank shareholders are all 
important economies along the belt. In the future, they 
will adopt the fund-raising strategy of the hard currency 
of international capital markets and the local market of 
member countries. The feasibility of local financing and 
the development of local capital markets is being studied. 
Local efficient and low-cost financing can effectively 
reduce the money and capital markets of developed coun-
tries. Over-reliance will enhance the asset pricing, trading 
and media functions of emerging economies'currencies.
Given the relative stability of RMB and its high inter-
national trade and investment liquidity, BRIC plans to 
issue the first issue of RMB bonds in the first half of next 
year to promote the internationalization of RMB. At the 
same time, in order to improve the liquidity of BRICs 
bond trading and money market, the Central Bank of 
BRIC is preparing to sign a double multilateral local 
swap agreement to promote the development of the in-
terest rate market in the countries concerned and reduce 
the cost of related currency swap, so as to provide di-
versified choices for emerging market countries and the 
countries along the "Belt and Road". The trans century 
"Belt and Road" initiative covers areas like Asia, Africa 
and Europe. Many countries along the border are devel-
oping countries. It is one of the regions with the greatest 
potential for Global trade and cross border investment 
growth[13]. The high cost of logistics and technology 
transfer is a major economic constraint at present. "Belt 
and Road" will greatly promote the development of local 
manufacturing, transportation and other infrastructure. 
Geoeconomic integration and the rise of the voice of 
emerging economies in global governance provide a 
source of impetus. Christopher Wood, a researcher at the 
South African Institute of International Studies, believes 
that BRICS was founded faster than many expected. As 
BRICS leaders have decided to set up a Regional Centre 
for Africa in South Africa, the BRICS Bank will bring a 
large shortage of funds for infrastructure construction in 
Africa. BRICS will not impose any political conditions 
on its financing. In the future, it will form a complemen-
tary relationship with the Asian Investment Bank and 
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effectively promote the development of the international 
financial system in a truly just and inclusive way.
Financial support is an essential guarantee for the 
"Belt and Road" infrastructure construction. In terms of 
macroeconomic fundamentals, the savings rate of resi-
dents in China (including Hong Kong) is about 50 per-
cent, and the GDP share of the savings rate ranks the top 
in the world. With the targeted reduction of the People's 
Bank of China at the end of September 2017, the inter-
bank lending rates in Hong Kong and Shanghai financial 
centres show a downward trend. High savings rate and 
low interest rate, combined with excess domestic indus-
trial capacity and low return on capital and other factors, 
will jointly promote the urgent need for the financial 
system and RMB to "go out". In sharp contrast, most of 
the "Belt and Road" countries have low domestic sav-
ings rates and high basic interest rates along the way, 
which seriously lack the accumulation of corresponding 
long-term construction funds. Various financial institu-
tions and enterprises in China, Shanghai and Hong Kong 
can not only invest a large amount of available funds in 
the "one belt" infrastructure and industrial construction 
through diversified investment and financing channels, 
but also effectively enhance the return on investment of 
domestic funds.
4.2. Challenges faced by BRICS Bank
Good governance structure is the mechanism basis for 
multilateral development banks to stabilize their business. 
Unlike the existing multilateral development financial 
institutions, which are led by a big country, the initial sub-
scribed capital of BRICS is distributed equally among the 
five founding countries, and no country has institutional 
dominance. Although this governance structure design 
is a kind of institutional innovation and experiment, it is 
essentially the product of compromise after fierce com-
petition within BRICS countries. Under the different 
conditions of BRICS countries'interest demands, although 
this governance structure fully respects the wishes of all 
participants, the actual effect of BRICS banks' operation 
remains to be observed due to the institutional differences 
and resource endowment limitations of BRICS countries.
First, the economic base on which BRICS countries 
rely for financial cooperation remains fragile. The fi-
nancial cooperation of EU members has proved that the 
degree of regional financial cooperation or financial inte-
gration depends fundamentally on the degree of regional 
economic integration, while BRICS countries can not be 
very close in their geoeconomic structure. In terms of 
geospatial distribution, BRICS countries span four con-
tinents: Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. Most 
of their economic growth relies on the extension model 
rather than the connotation model. The unbalanced eco-
nomic structure makes the economic development lack 
of sustainable motive force. In addition, because the 
economies of all countries are in the similar developed 
stage, there are still some limitations in cooperation and 
complementarity. BRICS has not yet made significant 
changes in infrastructure investment. Most of the current 
investment plans are financed by Chinese banks. BRICS 
may provide development and infrastructure funding 
for Africa, but it is not yet able to assert its ultimate di-
rection of development, nor can it guarantee that it will 
always put aid to Africa in the first place[14].
Secondly, the financial system development of BRICS 
countries is still unbalanced at this stage. The low effi-
ciency of financial operation makes it difficult to realize 
the optimal allocation of financial resources, which se-
riously hinders the deepening of financial cooperation 
among BRICS countries. BRICS's development model 
can operate effectively only when it has the freedom to 
decide project investment, or at least the decision space 
under the long-term development framework. Former 
chairman of the Asian Development Fund of the Asian 
Development Bank, John McAuley, said that BRICS 
banks must lend on a suitable scale with as few political 
purposes as possible in order to grow in the long run. 
Although there are many modes of operation of inter-
national financial institutions that can be used for refer-
ence, BRICS is different from other financial institutions 
in many aspects. It is necessary for BRICS to continue 
to explore and move forward in international financial 
practice.
Third, there are still complex conflicts of interest 
among BRICS countries. BRICS countries have similar 
development stages and modes. Their external depen-
dence is generally high. They are mostly at the low end 
of the value chain of international industrial division. 
Export-dependent economic growth and even trade pro-
tectionism often breed internal competition and conflict 
of interests. China's cheap labor force and relatively high 
production efficiency make its products have obvious 
price advantages in the Brazilian market, which has re-
peatedly attracted the Brazilian government's anti-dump-
ing investigations.
Fourth, the comparative advantages and comprehen-
sive national strengths of BRICS countries are not equal. 
The similar economic strength, resource endowment ad-
vantages and political system among member countries 
are the foundation for the stable development and long-
term stability of any organization. BRICS Group does 
not yet have the basic conditions of comprehensive eco-
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nomic and political cooperation, in which China's eco-
nomic status is particularly special, and its total econom-
ic output is far above the other four countries, making it 
always have a wary and competitive attitude towards the 
dominance of China's economy.
Because of the non-profit nature of multilateral devel-
opment banks, raising funds at a lower cost is a neces-
sary prerequisite for the normal operation of BRICS. An 
important condition for low-cost financing is to obtain 
a high credit rating. At present, the major international 
rating agencies provide supra-sovereign rating services 
for multilateral development banks, which are composed 
of the internal financial situation of multilateral devel-
opment banks and the support of external shareholders. 
Compared with other well-known multilateral devel-
opment banks, the paid-in capital of BRICS Bank is 
relatively high[15]. The ratio of paid-in capital to pending 
capital is 20 percent, and the paid-in capital totals 10 bil-
lion US dollars. A higher proportion of paid-in capital is 
conducive to BRICS's higher credit rating. However, at 
present, the sovereign credit rating of BRICS countries 
is below AAA. China's credit rating is "AA-" and other 
member countries are between "BBB-" and "BBB+", 
which makes the credit rating of major shareholders and 
shareholders based on equity weighting on the whole 
low, thus adversely affecting the credit rating of BRICS 
banks.
Compared with other major multilateral development 
banks, BRICS still lacks the participation of developed 
economies with higher credit rating. Moreover, accord-
ing to the existing international rating methods, if the 
members of multilateral development banks are also 
borrowers at the same time, the robustness of multi-
lateral development banks will be reduced in the case 
of "conflict of interest". The operation mechanism of 
BRICS Group has this characteristic, that is, member 
countries are both BRICS shareholders and borrowers, 
so it will have a negative impact on the credit rating of 
BRICS Bank. How to improve the credit rating and re-
duce the financing cost is a structural strategic demand 
for the sustainable operation of BRICS. Therefore, com-
pared with the World Bank or the International Monetary 
Fund, BRICS banks do not deliberately consider social 
interests in terms of lending. The unique implication of 
the BRICS mechanism is that the economic and political 
power of emerging market countries is rising as a whole, 
and that they have escalated into contributors rather than 
relying heavily on financial assistance from global finan-
cial institutions.
Multilateral development banks such as the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank usually aim at 
poverty alleviation and development. In contrast, BRICS 
and ADB pay more attention to infrastructure invest-
ment. Infrastructure investment is characterized by huge 
sunk cost, long recovery cycle and irregular cash flow. 
Therefore, compared with general industry investment, 
the risk coefficient of infrastructure investment is higher. 
The BRICS Bank has diversified the role of world fi-
nancial governance. Its birth is the first entity institution 
established under the framework of the BRICS Informal 
Conference. It is also a rational response and realistic 
choice of emerging economies to the absence of IMF 
reform. As a result, BRICS is regarded by some coun-
tries as a potential competitor of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. Lou Jiwei, former Minis-
ter of Finance of China, once said that BRICS is not a 
positive challenge to the existing international financial 
system. Historically, institutions such as the Asian De-
velopment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development did not weaken the status of the 
World Bank, but promoted the financial system at that 
time. BRICS is a complement to, rather than a substitute 
for, existing financial institutions in the public or private 
sectors. It will not only significantly enhance the voice 
of emerging economies within the framework of interna-
tional financial development, but also provide additional 
support for the economic construction of developing 
countries.
5. Conclusion
BRICS can not only effectively promote the reform of 
global economic governance and complement the short-
comings and blind spots of the existing system, but also 
complement the reform of the supply side of China's 
economy. In addition, the establishment and operation 
of the emergency reserve fund will promote infrastruc-
ture construction and sustainable economic development 
in emerging markets and developing countries, as well 
as better guard against geo-financial risks and maintain 
global financial stability. It is of great significance and 
can greatly enhance the position and voice of developing 
countries in the global governance system and the inter-
national financial system. BRICS, the Emergency Re-
serve Fund and the China-led Asian Investment Bank are 
the most favourable counterattacks by BRICS countries 
against the delay of IMF reform in the West. Although any 
issues related to short-term currency circulation remain 
unresolved, BRICS is more likely than the Emergency 
Reserve Fund to put pressure on IMF reform. Over the 
next 10 to 20 years, BRICS will also substantially reduce 
social inequality, widespread corruption, education and 
environmental problems, which will not only contribute to 
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the long-term economic stability of BRICS countries, but
also complement the market-oriented reform of China's fi-
nancial industry, the process of RMB internationalization
and the strategy of foreign direct investment.
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